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ARGUMENT1 
POINT I: THE INTERVENORS HAVE CORRECTLY STATED 
THEIR CASE REGARDING FARM PROPERTY 
AND DESERET WATER STOCK 
Both the Appellee Wife and Intervenor Parents correctly point out that the 
resolution of the issue regarding ownership of the farm property and Deseret Water 
stock "may affect the overall equity of the property settlement."2 Defendant Husband 
had already acknowledged that the disparity in the property settlement would be 
greater than already indicated were this Court to grant the same.3 
Defendant Husband agrees with the Interveners that 
[t]he [marshaled] evidence shows a joint farming venture. All parties 
put money down. All parties contributed to monthly payments. All parties 
paid toward principal and interest. All parties participated in farming. All 
parties paid portions of the water stock assessments. All parties paid 
towards the water stock debt. 
The evidence is overwhelming that the land and water stock were 
owned by all four of the parties. There is no factual support for the court's 
findings that the Intervenors had no interest in real property (the farm) and 
the Deseret Irrigation Company water stock. It is an abuse of discretion to 
ignore the joint farming venture, to ignore the deeds, and to ignore what the 
parties intended.4 
1
 To the degree this Court desires citation to the record rather than transcript 
and documents included in the Addendum in Appellant Husband's Opening Brief, a 
copy of the Opening Brief with all citations to the record included is included in the 
Addendum. 
2
 Page 4, paragraph one of the Brief of Appellee-Wife; Page 1, paragraph 1 of 
Appellant Intervenors. 
3
 Page 10, paragraph 1 of the Opening Brief of Appellant Husband. 
4
 Pages 5-6, paragraphs 4-5 of Brief of Appellant Intervenors. 
1 
Assuming that this Court would agree, the impact of allowing the award on the 
Defendant Husband would be as follows:5 
Appellee-Wife Appellant-Husband 
Present Status $ 70,587 < $ 509 > 
Adopting Intervenors' 
Position $ 70,587 < $ 16,359 > 
For reasons noted below, regardless of the position this court takes on the Intervenor 
Parents' claims, the property division by the trial court is an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II: THE PROPERTY DIVISION IMPROPERLY ADJUSTED FOR 
THE PARTIES PRE-MARITAL POSITIONS AND MUST BE MODIFIED6 
Appellee-Wife's citation of the general rule that equity requires each party retain 
the separate property brought into the marriage7 failed to include standard exceptions 
such as "whether the property has been commingled, whether the other spouse has by 
his or her efforts augmented, maintained or protected the separate property, and 
5
 These figures are computed by taking the values of the property division 
summarized on the Table on pages 7-8 of Appellant Husband's Brief and lowering the 
value of the farm by fifty percent (50%) from $ 20,780, to $ 10,390 and lowering the 
value of the Deseret Water stock fifty percent (50%), from $ 10,920 to $ 5,460. This is 
done on the assumption that the parties and Intervenors are 50/50 joint owners. 
6
 The Appellee-Wife's Brief objects to the argument in Appellant-Husband's brief 
that the court's findings were inconsistent regarding the award of the I.R.S. debt. In 
light of the fact that no effort has been made to have the lower court correct a clerical 
error pursuant to Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P., Appellee-Wife should be limited in continuing to 
make the argument here, not having availed themselves of the opportunity in the court 
below. 
7
 Appellee Wife's Brief at 10. 
2 
whether the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result."8 In this case, each 
of these three standards is applicable, and when applied, indicates the property is 
inequitable and an abuse of discretion. 
First, as to commingling, in the Amended Findings, the trial court specifically 
found that when the parties refinanced the Southgate, California, home that "[t]hese 
debts and assets were all commingled, with the exception of the defendant's tax debt."9 
There is no case law in Utah that directly establishes how a court would make a 
determination that a pre-marital debt (as distinct from property) was not commingled 
when assets that were used to pay the debt were, in fact, commingled. The debt was 
satisfied by proceeds from a loan, incurred after marriage, and for which both parties 
were liable, being secured by property in both of their names. The Appellee-Wife's 
appellate brief did not address the argument that "no evidence exists to contradict that 
the [I.R.S.] payment had been a gift or other non-liability situation from one spouse to 
the other."10 
Second, Appellee-wife's efforts to balance the disparate property division by 
subtracting the initial equity the Appellee-Wife had in the home at the time of marriage 
fails to take in to account that the Appellant-Husband contributed to the valuation of the 
home by giving her all of his salary when he worked for Hughes or Quaker Oats11 as 
8
 Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ct. App, Utah 1990). 
9
 Record at 162, lines 15-16. 
10
 Appellant Husband's Opening Brief at 11. 
11
 Record at 295-296. 
3 
well as repair ing, painting and )ther hor- orovements (such as working on 
a redwood deck for the home.12 Furthermore, as the home in Southgate, California, 
was "commingled,"1 3 and since marital efforts and funds helped enhance the value of 
t l I I I ' 111 M " J U *' " m n r e r i f l h i i l l ||||| , ||||| | II|| ||||||| || | m 1111 m \\ |||n || , | 11 | || | \ || || | || l l ( | ( ' S . Il II III '" 
trial c o i / 4 k> .• -: - .^: the gross equity in home at the time of the marr iage was 
$ len the hoi) le sold 
the plaintiff and defendant received a net sun i of $ 52,413.04. Of the net 
proceeds, the plaintiff and defendant paid $36,390.04 to retire their farm 
mortgage obligation; plaintiff and defendant used the remaining $ 1 6 0 2 3 00 
for In nng and farm expenses.1 6 
Thus < IP H value of the Home, improvements, and inflation al lowed the 
entir ^ GBD - ant-Husband as wel l as other marital and pre-
martial O D I I — * - - - '* ~^ i l pp \A / £ - ~ -.-*—--
amount slightly over the ii a> t n 000.00 gross equity that the court Toun, 
tl lie II ii' : i in € a t till = • tiiiiii i i = ::: 1 "i i is JI i \a ,ge \18 
Recon 
12
 R 3 ordat299, 300, and 337. 
13
 Record at 162, lines 15-16. 
1,1
 I!'" Il a! JI ' .J J "i B ,iUII 
15
 Record at 163, Amended Fii idings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, |" 6; 
r^cuu 160. 
17
 Record at 295. 
is n j S important to note that gross equity in a property brought into the marr iage 
does not equate with net proceeds or net worth (which is what was to be div ided at the 
t ime of the divorce.) Not only are there sell ing costs before net equity is obtained from 
an asset, but also there is uncontroverted evidence that A p p o | | ^ - W i f e brought some 
In addition, not only was the property commingled, but it was the Appellant-
Husband that brought in the expertise necessary to farm. While entering into the 
farming operations was a joint decision,19 it was undisputed that the 
Appellee-Wife was not involved in the farming operations and did not know how to run 
or operate a farm.20 
Third, in this case, the length of the parties' marriage indicates that it would be 
inequitable to restore the parties to their pre-marital condition. Equitable efforts to 
restore parties to their respective position before marriage is often emphasized when a 
marriage is of a short rather than a long duration. Unfortunately, the case law is not 
crystal clear on how to define what is a long or short marriage. For example, marriages 
of approximately 38 years is of long duration;21 13 years is not short;22 7 years is of 
short duration.23 In this case, the parties lived together for almost two years prior to 
debt of an unknown amount into the marriage as well as that asset. See record at 295 
in which Appellant says about Wife that "[s]he had a lot of credit cards when I married 
her." 
19
 The record indicates that Elaine wanted to move to Utah because of the riots 
in California, and she called the Interveners many times about finding a farm. They 
found five farms and Appellee-Wife picked out the farm they purchased. See Record at 
278-279,312,321. 
20
 Record at 
21
 Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, (Utah 1988). 
22
 Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
23
 Rappleve v. Rappleve. 855 P.2d 260, (Ut. App. 1993). 
5 
marriage24 and then were married for slightly over nine years.25 This marriage is not of 
a "short duration;" therefore, the length of this marriage is not an equitable basis for 
restoring the parties to their pre-marital positions. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED 
ALIMONY AGAINST THE HUSBAND 
Appellee-Wife has failed to respond to the arguments raised by Appellant-
Husband in that the third factor under the test enunciated in Jones v. Jones26 — 
the ability of the payor spouse to provide for the same — was not addressed by the 
court. Furthermore, any reference by Appellee-Wife to an "able-bodied" Appellant-
Husband is somewhat superficial; the trial court heard all of the evidence regarding the 
Appellant-Husband's abilities, inability to find work, and the limited income available 
from the joint farming enterprise27, and only imputed monthly income to him of $ 746.67. 
Her income was $ 1,028.50. 
The property settlement of the parties does not justify the imposition of alimony 
on the Appellant-Husband; either he is in a negative position of < $ 509.00 >, or, if this 
Court grants the Intervenors' Position, < $ 16,359.00>. On top of this, Appellant-
Husband does not have an asset or income producing base that would warrant the 
24
 Record at 297, lines 12-15. 
25
 The Motion of Appellee-Wife to Amend the Original Decree was filed with 
sufficient time to arrest the original entry of divorce and postpone termination of the 
marriage until entry of the decree. 
26
 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
27
 Record at 261, 263. 
6 
imposition of alimony.28 
The effort to impose alimony and make the parties' monthly positions even more 
disparate — $ 1,203.50 for Appellee-Wife and $ 571.67 for Appellant-Husband — 
ignores basic reality that has been acknowledged previously by the Utah Supreme 
Court. "When one blanket is cut to fit two beds, it seldom will cover them both."29 In 
other words, 
[t]his is one of those all-too-frequent situations where the court was 
confronted with the impossible task of attempting to cut one blanket to cover 
two beds and satisfy both parties when the truth of the matter is that they 
cannot afford a divorce, but must have one anyway.30 
The Appellee-Wife married Appellant-Husband "for better or for worse." "This does not 
mean the 'better' for her and the 'worse' for him."31 
Even were alimony justified, the provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) were not 
followed. There was no limitation on the number of years alimony would be in effect. 
At the trial, the Appellee-Wife only asked for alimony as long as the duration of the 
marriage.32 There is no way to determine when alimony will terminate in this case. 
28
 Appellant-Husband testified that he lacks the funds for necessary capital 
improvements and purchase of machinery for the farm. He is forced to hire outside 
labor for the swathing, bailing, and related operations. (Record at 261, 265, 267.) His 
is paying rent of $ 150.00 per month to his parents for a small trailer (Record at 259). 
Appellant-Husband was also obligated to pay all outstanding debts of the marriage 
(Record at 169.) 
29
 Gale v. Gale. 258 P.2d 986, 987 (Utah 1953). 
30
 Bader v. Bader. 424 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1967). 
31
 Anderson v. Anderson. 422 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1967). 
32
 Record 
7 
As the Decree does not comply with statutory requirements, Appellant-Husband should 
be relieved of the effect of that judgment until it is corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
The Intervenor Parents have correctly claimed their portion of the joint 
agricultural enterprises of the parties to this litigation. 
It is not equitable to restore the Appellee-Wife to her premarital financial 
condition because of extensive commingling of assets, contributions by the Appellant-
Husband, and the nine-year length of the parties' marriage. 
Permanent alimony is not appropriate when Appellee-Wife's income and net-
worth significantly exceed that of Appellant-Husband and statutory requirements were 
not complied with. 
For all of the foregoing, the trial court's division of property and award of alimony 
are inconsistent in justification and create reversible error for an abuse of discretion by 
imposing inequitable treatment on Appellant-Husband. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1997. 
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C. 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorney for Appellant-Husband 
8 
ADDENDUM 
III. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The date of the order appealed from in this case is November 1, 1986. The 
notice of appeal was filed on November 27, 1986. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C. A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
A post-judgment Rule 60(b) motion was heard June 17, 1997 and was orally 
denied. The order denying the motion has not yet been executed or filed by the trial 
court, and therefore is not, at this juncture, part of this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue # 1 : Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to the 
Appellee under the standard announced in Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
and the statutory standards of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7). 
"[A] trial court's award of alimony is reviewed for clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion." Endrodv v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah. App. 1996) (citation 
omitted.) The issue was raised in pages 2-3 of the memorandum filed by counsel for 
Appellant, Eldon Eliason, when he objected to the Appellee's motion to amend the 
earlier order of the court which had not awarded alimony. The denial of alimony was 
also addressed in Intervener's Objection to Amend the Findings (R. 116.), which were 
concurred in by the Appellant by his counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996. 
(R. 125-122.) 
Issue # 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it assessed a judgment 
against the Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256.72, which was 
a payment of Appellee's pre-martial obligation to the I.R.S.? 
1 
u[T]he trial court's property division is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard." Endrody v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996) (citation 
omitted). 
Objections to the inclusion of an independent judgment for an I.R.S. obligation 
were specifically raised in the arguments of the Intervenors in response to the 
Appellee's Motion to Amend the Findings and Decree (R. 101 - 97.), which were 
concurred in by the Appellant by his counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996 
(R. 122.) 
Issue # 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered a judgment 
against the Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256.72, when the 
legal conclusion does not comport with the Findings of Fact made by the trial court? 
If "a trial court should make findings of fact necessarily inconsistent with each 
other, such action would be capricious and . . . such inconsistent findings would not be 
permitted to stand." Malstrom v. Consolidated Theaters. 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 
1955). 
An objection to the form and nature of the orders entered by the trial court from 
which an appeal are taken need not be raised before the trial court when such orders 
are prepared by the Appellee's counsel; in the alternative, if the pleadings are 
improper, and were prepared by the Appellee's counsel, then the inconsistent findings 
are to be stricken, along with the legal conclusion. 
V. Dispositive Legal Citations 
Dispositive legal citations in this case include the following: 
2 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1): "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in its equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties: 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h): "Alimony may not be ordered for duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of 
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony 
for a longer period of time." 
VI. Statement of the Case 
After living together for approximately two years in California, (R. 297, lines 12-
15.), the Plaintiff-Appellee wife and Defendant-Appellant husband were married in 
California on October 24, 1987. (R. 203, line 23.) In December of 1987, the parties 
mortgaged what had been a pre-martial home of the Plaintiff, (which home had been 
placed in the name of both parties). (Amended Decree, If 8, R. .) While some monies 
were used for points, adding on to the home, and for an eventual down payment on a 
farm in Utah, the majority of the funds were used to pay a premarital I.R.S. debt of the 
Defendant. (R. 168.) The Defendant had not participated in making house payments 
until he was married ( R. 297, lines 18-23). When working for Hughes or Quaker Oats, 
Appellant gave all of his salary to the Appellee which she administered as she thought 
best, (R. 298-299), from a joint bank account (R. 215, lines 20-25), he relying on the 
community property provisions of the state of California (R. 299, lines 14-18). One-half 
of the house payment was greater than the rent he would have been paying elsewhere 
(R. 299, line 19 - R. 300, line 2.) He also worked on the home, including placing on a 
3 
redwood deck (R. 300, lines 3-4). In May 1990, the Appellee and Appellant purchased 
a 70 acre farm in Delta, Utah. (R. 161, lines 17-20.) The parties separated in June of 
1994. (R. 159, line 6.) Trial was held on October 13, 1995. (R. 185.) 
During the trial, the trial Court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a pre-
marital I.R.S. obligation of Appellant. In the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court found that an I.R.S. obligations of the Appellant incurred 
prior to their marriage was not commingled with the property of the parties. The 
amount of the obligation was $ 20,256.72. (R. 162-161, page 3-4, fl 8.) Thereafter, 
however, the trial court found that the Appellant's I.R.S. obligations relative to the 
Appellee were "one-half of which amount defendant may retain and one-half which the 
plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of $ 10,128.36." (R. 157, page 8, U 25.) Thereafter 
this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant in 
the amount of $ 20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant's debt 
with the I.R.S." (R. 155, page 10, U 39.) The Amended Decree awarded judgment to 
the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $20,256.72. (R. 168, page 3,1J11.) The 
property distribution arising out of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law is properly summarized as follows: 
Appellee Appellant Interveners 
Assets 
Sutherland Home $36,250 Farm $ 20,780 
Water Payment Melville Melville 
from Defendant $9,203 Water $27,900 Water $27,900 
4 
Deseret 
Water $ 10.920 
Applt. 
to Pay $ 2.700 
Payment from 
Interveners 
Deseret Water 
Shares 
Judgment for 
I.R.S. Gift 
Debts 
1/21992 I.R.S.Debt 
$ 4,500 
$ 728 
$ 20.256 
$ 70,937 
$ _350 
$ 59,600 
Suther. Hm. 
Loan $25,000 
Water 
Liability $ 2,700 
Water 
Liability $ 9,203 
Marital 
Debts $ 2,600 
Judg. 
for IRS. 
Gift $ 20,256 
1/21992 
I.R.S. 
Debt $ 350 
$ 30,600 
Rental 
Costs $ 4.500 
$ 350 $60.109 $ 4.500 
NET PROPERTY $ 70.587 (— $ 509) $26.100 
(The valuations of the home, farm, and water are taken from the Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 164-152.); the intervener's obligation of $ 4,500.00 to 
Appellee is found on page 4, fl 9 (R. 161); intervener's loans to the parties in the 
5 
amount of f$ 2,700.00 is found on page 6,1J17 (R. 159.); page 10, U 5 (R. 155.); the 
joint IRS tax liability for 1992 is found on page 11, j | 40 (R. 154.); the payment to the 
Appellee for the water stock in the amount of $ 9,203.36 is taken from the Decree of 
Divorce (R. 169.) 
The trial court also found that the Appellee received $ 229.00 in a monthly 
pension benefit and $ 799.900 in monthly social security disability benefits, for a total 
monthly income of $ 1,028.50. Defendant had $ 736.67 income imputed to him. (R. 163, 
U 5.) Alimony of $ 175.00 per month was awarded in favor of Appellee. (R. 163.) 
Paragraph 7 b of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 162.) and 
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree (R. 168.) did not designate when the alimony 
was to terminate or any extenuating circumstances that justified an award of the same 
beyond the time period of the marriage. 
VII. Summary of the Arguments 
The trial court's award of alimony clearly abused its discretion when it failed to 
consider the binding standards articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Jones v. Jones.1 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to properly take into account 
the "ability of the husband to provide support."2 The trial court also failed to follow the 
statutory requirements of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding alimony for an unlimited 
time . The Court also abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-marital 
1
 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
2
 Id. at 1075. 
6 
debt of the Appellant paid, in part, by Appellee, almost eight years before the decree 
was entered and (2) entering a judgment that did not comport with the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
VIII. Argument 
A. The Award of Alimony Was Clearly An Abuse of Discretion 
The trial court found that Appellee had monthly income of $ 1, 028.50 and 
Appellant had imputed monthly income of $ 746.67. When the alimony ordered by the 
Court is taken into account, the monthly income of the Plaintiff-wife becomes $ 
1,203.50 and that of the Defendant-husband becomes $ 571.67. If a minimum debt 
service of $ 300.00 per month secured by the Melville water stock (on which Appellant 
has already received a cash payment for her portion) is made, the imputed income of 
Appellant is lessened to $ 271.67. The payment of rent by Appellant in the amount of $ 
150.00 per month (R. 259, lines 17-22) would leave the Appellant with $ 121.67 for all 
of the personal living expenses as well as other debt service imposed by the trial court. 
Awarding alimony under these circumstance failed to take into account the financial 
situation of the Appellant as required by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jones 
v. Jones. The property settlement and debt obligations of parties do not justify a 
different result. When the division of property is completely resolved, the property 
interests balance as follows: Appellee receives $ 70,587.00, Appellant receives a 
negative $509, and Intervenors receive $ 26,100.00. (In the event that Intervenors are 
granted additional relief, the disparity will increase.) For all of the foregoing, it was an 
abuse of discretion to award alimony under the facts of this case. 
7 
Even if any award of alimony is proper, the provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) 
provide that u[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time." Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree (R. 168.) did not 
designate when the alimony was to terminate or any extenuating circumstances. As 
the Decree does not comply with the statutory requirements, Appellant should be 
relieved of that effect of the judgment until it is corrected in accordance with law. 
B. Awarding Appellee the "IRS Judgment" Was An Abuse of Discretion 
During the trial, the trial court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a pre-
marital I.R.S. obligation of Defendant Boyd E. Broderick. In the Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court found that this payment was to be divided 
between the parties "one-half of which amount defendant may retain and one-half 
which the plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of $ 10,128.36." (R. 157, ^ 25.) 
Thereafter this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $ 20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the 
defendant's debt with the I.R.S." (R. 155, H 39.) The Amended Decree awarded 
judgment to the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $ 20,256.72. (R. 168, H 11.) The 
amount of the judgment is in error for at least three reasons. 
First, having already found in paragraph 25 of the findings that one-half of the 
I.R.S. debt could be retained by the Appellant, or $ 10,128.36, an award of $ 
20,256.72 against the Appellant as a judgment for the entire I.R.S. payment is in error. 
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"The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by 
a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law." Smith v. 
Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Indeed, if "a trial court should make findings of 
fact necessarily inconsistent with each other, such action would be capricious and that 
such inconsistent findings would not be permitted to stand." Malstrom v. Consolidated 
Theaters. 4 Utah2d 181, 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1955). 
Second, assigning the Appellant total liability for the I.R.S. debt is an abuse of 
discretion when no evidence exists to contradict that the payment had been a gift or 
other non-liability situation from one spouse to the other.3 Had there been any intent to 
hold the Appellant liable for the I.R.S. obligation, it could easily have been included in a 
pre-marital or post-marital agreement4 or some other evidence of intent to hold a party 
liable for a paid debt in the event of a divorce. 
Third, for the significant disparity of property division, and the fact that the 
Appellant contributed all of his salary during the marriage to the family checking 
account in reliance on the marriage relationship,5 it is inequitable under the doctrine of 
3
 This concept follows the standard used in evaluating gifts and exchanges of 
inherited or other property between spouses who later divorce. Osguthorpe v. 
Osauthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah App. 1990), citing Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 
P.2d 304, 308(Utah 1988) (Emphasis added.) See also Willev v. Willev. 866 P.2d 547, 
555 (Utah App. 1993). 
4
 Matter of Estate of Beesley. 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994). 
5
 See Hearing Transcript (R. 297-300.) pointing out that he had lived there for 
two years before the marriage without making house payments (R. 297, lines 11-20), 
did not participate in making house payments until he was married (R. 297, lines 18-
23), and when working for Hughes or Quaker Oats, gave all of his salary to the Plaintiff 
which she administered as she thought best, (R. 296, line 7 - R. 295, line 15), from a 
9 
equitable estoppel (as raised in Appellant's answer) to now impose liability on him for 
this newly created, inequitable obligation arising from conduct over nine years before. 
There was no evidence introduced indicating that at the time of the payment of the 
I.R.S. obligation there was a contemporaneous understanding or attempt by the 
Appellee to hold the Appellant liable for the debt or that there was any intent to 
preserve the payment as an asset of the Appellee. 
Thus, regardless of the theory used, awarding an independent judgment for the 
entire amount of the payment made for Appellant's pre-marital I.R.S. obligation does 
not follow "logically from, [nor] is supported by the evidence and controlling legal 
principles [or equity]." Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 
IX: Conclusion 
The trial court abused its discretion in determining to award alimony to Appellee 
as well as an judgment for a pre-marital I.R.S. obligation of the Appellant. In awarding 
alimony, the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to consider the 
binding standards articulated in the case of Jones v. Jones. 6 wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed three factors that must be considered when making an 
award of alimony. The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to properly 
joint bank account (R. 215, lines 20-25), he relying on the community property 
provisions of the state of California (R. 295, lines 14-18), which payment was greater 
than the rent he would have been paying elsewhere (R. 295, line 19 - R. 300, line 2.) 
Having made such payments, and worked on the home, including placing on a redwood 
deck (R. 300, lines 3-4), because of the marital relationship, the Plaintiff may not now 
ignore the marriage relationship to regain a gift she made over nine years ago as part 
of that relationship. 
6
 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
10 
take into account the "ability of the husband to provide support."7 The trial court also 
failed to follow the statutory requirements of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding alimony 
for an unlimited time . 
The trial court further abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-
marital debt of the Appellant paid, in part, by Appellee, almost nine years before the 
decree was entered and (2) entering a judgment that did not comport with the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
X: Addendum 
The following documents are included with Appellants' Opening brief as an 
Addendum: 
1. Amended Decree of Divorce dated October 31, 1996, filed November 1, 1996. 
2. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions and Law, dated October 31, 
1996, filed 
November 1, 1996. 
3. Notice of Appeal dated November 27, 1996, filed November 27, 1996. 
4. Transcript of Trial, pages 1, 19, 77, 115-118. 
5. Objection to Motion to Proposed Finding, Memorandum and Closing Argument 
from Appellants' Counsel, pages 1-4. 
6. Objection to Motion to Amend, etc., Interveners, pages 1, 5-6 
7
 Id. at 1075. 
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